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PATENT LITIGATION ATTORNEYS’ FEES: 
SHIFTING FROM STATUS TO CONDUCT 
 
Daniel Roth* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Abusive patent assertion results in deadweight losses to society. Faced 
with the high cost of patent litigation, companies often settle for an amount 
equal to a fraction of the cost of defending a patent infringement suit. This 
allows the patent owner to extract settlements from many individuals without the 
risk of invalidation before a federal court. Shifting attorneys’ fees to the 
prevailing party is a remedy courts award in exceptional cases to deter patent 
owners from bringing unreasonable claims of infringement and to return 
defendants to the position they were in prior to litigation. Current fee-shifting 
proposals target patent assertion entities rather than scrutinizing the heart of 
the infringement claim—the patent claims and the activities of the accused 
infringer. This Note analyzes the history of fee-shifting in patent cases and 
examines the proposed SHIELD Act. Next, this Note describes the problems with 
the proposed legislation’s definition of disfavored patent plaintiffs, bad actors, 
and the loser-pays rule. Finally, this Note concludes by proposing a solution, 
which modifies the standard for shifting attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
INTRODUCTION 
As a small business owner opens her mail, she receives a letter from a 
company that she has never heard of before. She is surprised to read that this 
company is accusing her of infringing a patent that covers her photocopier and 
demands she pay a whopping $1000 per employee. She is not sure what to do 
next: call an attorney, pay the licensing fee, or try to bargain with the patent 
owner. 
This is an all-too-common occurrence in which a patent owner targets 
small companies who cannot afford to defend an infringement lawsuit and do 
not understand patent law.1 Many patent owners have started to engage in patent 
  
 * Copyright © 2014 Daniel Roth. The author would like to thank Professors Christi 
Guerrini, Edward Lee, and David Schwartz, as well as all of the participants in the 2013 
Summer IP Writing Colloquium at Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1 Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Shell Companies Shake Down Small Businesses for 
$1K per Employee for Using Network Scanner, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130102/08174721543/patent-troll-shell-companies-
shake-down-small-businesses-1k-per-employee-using-network-scanner.shtml. 
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enforcement through shell companies that send out infringement letters to 
hundreds of users of a product, in this case, any scanner connected to the 
Internet.2 Targeting users further down the supply chain rather than the scanner 
manufacturers directly allows the patent holder to collect a huge number of 
settlements and avoid litigation.3 Following this model is very lucrative and low 
risk, because, unlike large manufacturers, the targets of these letters do not have 
the capital, legal acumen or incentive to invalidate the asserted patents.4 
The patent system is justified by weighing the benefit to society of a new 
and useful invention against the profits and licensing fees gained by the 
invention’s creator.5 Frivolous patent litigation is a problem that results in 
deadweight losses, which are eventually passed on to consumers.6 When the 
economics of patent litigation allow patent trolls to demand license fees with 
virtually no risk, society as a whole is worse off.7 
The patent-trolling practice has recently garnered the attention of 
President Obama and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).8 Calls for action 
against the owners of the these patents are justified by the massive economic 
effects to American small businesses; however, in making policy choices to 
deter patent trolling, it is imperative to recognize the importance of making 
patent law business-entity-neutral so that we do not devalue patents thereby 
diminishing the incentive to invent.9 
Traditionally, each party pays its own patent litigation costs. An 
exception to this default rule lies in § 285 of the patent statute, which states: 
  
 2 See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 
106), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117421. 
 3 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash. 
U. L. Rev. 237, 243–44 (2006). 
 4 John R. Allison, Mark A Lemley, & John Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 700–01 (2011). 
 5 Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 239. 
 6 Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a “Loser Pays” Rule on the American 
Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 567, 568 (2011). 
 7 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF SCI. 
& TECH. POLICY, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, Jun. 2013, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 8 Grant Gross, FTC to Launch New Investigation of Patent Trolls, PCWORLD (June 
20, 2013), available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/2042557/ftc-to-launch-new-
investigation-of-patent-trolls.html. 
 9 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Troll Panel at Yale Law School, PATENTLY-O 
(May 14, 2013), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/patent-troll-
panel-at-yale-law-school.html. 
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“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”10 However, defendants who attempt to utilize fee-shifting 
under § 285 rarely succeed.11 The low success rate is attributable to the courts’ 
two-prong requirement that litigation was both (a) brought in bad faith and (b) 
objectively baseless.12 
In an effort to deter frivolous litigation, proposed changes to § 285 would 
automatically require certain bad actors asserting patent infringement or 
defending patent validity to pay the adverse party’s attorneys’ fees should the 
bad actor fail on the validity or infringement analysis.13 As proposed, the 
SHIELD Act of 2013 defines parties subject to fee-shifting as a party alleging 
infringement that is not: an original inventor or assignee, engaged in exploitation 
of the patent through production or sale, or a university or technology transfer 
center.14 The bill states that the “Court shall award the recovery of full costs” to 
the prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement.15 
This Note recognizes that existing fee-shifting proposals target patent 
owners based upon a problematic classification and proposes a fee-shifting 
regime to reduce frivolous patent litigation claims that focuses on the plaintiff’s 
behavior rather than its status. The proposed framework will address the 
shortcomings of the existing litigation framework and proposed solutions by 
analyzing the merits of the infringement claim rather than attempting to define 
class of “bad actor” patent infringement plaintiffs. 
Part I analyzes the costs and economics of patent litigation and presents 
the existing mechanisms available to deter frivolous patent litigation. Next, Part 
II proposes a solution, which would modify § 285 of the patent statute. Finally, 
Part III addresses potential criticisms of the proposed fee-shifting framework. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF PATENT EXTORTION AND A FEE-SHIFTING 
PROPOSAL TO CURB IT 
The economics of patent litigation force the recipient of an infringement 
letter to either (1) settle with the patent owner and pay a license fee, or (2) 
  
 10 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
 11 Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls Pay in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-
patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?_r=0 (finding that fees were shifted only twenty times in 
nearly three thousand patent cases in 2011). 
 12 MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 916 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 
iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (“Under this standard, 
a patentee’s case ‘must have no objective foundation, and the plaintiff must actually 
know this.’”). 
 13 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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defend itself in federal district court.16 Whether the patent is valid and infringed 
or not may not be of primary concern to the recipient of an infringement letter. 
When the company is faced with two options, each of which will require it to 
expend substantial sums of money, it will choose the option that will cost the 
least. 
A. Patent Litigation 
A patent does not confer the right to practice the claimed invention. 
Instead, it only provides the right to exclude others from practicing the 
invention.17 Inventors may exploit the invention by licensing the technology or 
by enforcing the patent rights in federal court. An action for patent infringement 
gives the owner of the patent the ability to seek damages and/or injunctions 
against others that practice the claimed invention.18 However, alleged infringers 
may challenge the patent by providing clear and convincing evidence in order to 
invalidate it. 
The costs associated with patent litigation are high as suits can range from 
$0.5 million to $3 million per claim at issue.19 The incentives for parties to settle 
is likewise high because as it becomes likely for a patent to be invalidated, the 
patent holder is willing to grant a cheap license, and the defendant is likely to 
accept an offer rather than incur further legal costs.20 This creates a system 
where a patent will not become invalidated unless the alleged infringers’ costs of 
continued litigation are less than the proposed license. 
  
 16 But see Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 107). 
The new inter partes review (IPR) and post grant review (PGR) proceedings 
authorized by the America Invents Act may present opportunities for low-cost 
patent invalidation. The final rules were set in late 2012, and thus we do not 
know yet whether this will reduce the wasteful transaction costs in challenging 
low-quality patents. Perhaps, as some have contended, the estoppel provision 
governing both IPR and PGR may prove to be too heavy a burden for 
challengers to bear, but perhaps not. 
Id. (manuscript at 126) (citations omitted). 
 17 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 18 Id. §§ 283–284. 
 19 Jim Kerstetter, How Much is that Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET (Apr. 
5, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/how-much-is-that-patent-
lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/ (quoting the American Intellectual Property Law Association 
Economic Survey of 2011). 
 20 Kesan & Ball, supra note 3, at 243. 
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B. Patent Monetization 
Patents are a unique asset which requires significant investment to 
obtain,21 but do not generate revenue unless licensed or asserted. Patents are also 
alienable; the right to exclude others from practicing the claims may be bought 
or sold at will. These attributes have led to the rise of patent aggregators, who do 
not practice the invention, but instead procure or purchase patents and enforce 
them against others who infringe.22 Such aggregators are called non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), patent assertion entities (PAEs), patent monetization entities 
(PMEs), or, more pejoratively, patent trolls.23 These patent holders are often 
characterized as entities that contribute nothing to society, but merely wait for 
others to bring a product to market and demand a toll as their primary source of 
revenue. 
C. The Evolution of the Criticism of “Bad Actors” 
As the number of NPEs has grown, so has criticism.24 The conventional 
wisdom is that NPEs block innovation by forcing productive companies to pay 
for a patent license without adding any value to society themselves.25 A common 
criticism is that NPEs have no fear of being counter-sued for infringement, and, 
thus, are unwilling to settle on reasonable terms.26 However, “[p]atent 
aggregation is not limited to NPEs anymore, if it ever was.”27 While contempt 
for NPEs is widespread, many believe that analyses of NPE litigation must be 
closely scrutinized to determine which instances are abusive litigation and which 
are asserting patents that are valid and infringed.28 
  
 21 Legal fees associated with preparation of United States and foreign patent 
applications, navigating the patent prosecution process, and maintenance fees for a patent 
family can approach $100,000. Steven J. Shumaker, Building a Patent Portfolio that 
Supports Your Business Objectives 1 n.1 (2002), available at 
http://www.ssiplaw.com/files/strategy.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
 22 Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 96 (2013). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 
376 (2012) (finding the impact of patent monetization entities on patent litigation is both 
dramatic and growing over time). 
 25 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs of NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21–22), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2091210. The direct costs of NPE 
patent litigation are “substantial, totaling about $29 billion accrued cost in 2011.” Id. 
(manuscript at 42). A substantial portion of the stated $29 billion is a “deadweight loss to 
society.” Id. (manuscript at 16). 
 26 Risch, supra note 22, at 96. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 110). 
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There is certainly no uniformly accepted definition of who is an NPE or 
patent troll.29 Some entities clearly fall within most definitions of these “bad 
actors,” e.g., a shell company unrelated to the original inventors that purchases a 
patent for the sole purpose of enforcement. 
1. Bessen & Meurer: Defining the Bad Actor 
In their oft-cited paper on the cost of NPEs to society,30 Bessen and 
Meurer use an expansive definition of non-practicing entity, which exceeds even 
those used by those most critical of NPEs.31 Bessen and Meurer equate NPE and 
patent troll and use RPX’s definition of NPE which includes: PAE’s, individual 
inventors, universities, and non-competing entities (operating companies 
asserting patents well outside the area in which they make products and 
compete).32 This definition is extremely broad; many leading scholars do not 
consider universities to be patent trolls even though they rarely engage in 
commercialization of a product.33 In the patent food chain, university faculty and 
graduate students are often true innovators that file patent applications through 
tech-transfer centers and are less likely to engage in patent assertion.34 Academic 
research does not involve manufacturing, marketing, or distribution and, 
therefore, would fall under the extremely broad definition of non-practicing 
entity that seems to cover every patent owner that does not bring a product, 
covered by the patent, to market.35 
Similarly, many do not view individual inventors as bad actors.36 
Individual inventors frequently complain that most large companies ignore 
requests to license their patents, even when infringing, without the inventor first 
having brought suit for patent infringement.37 If university and individual 
patentees are to receive compensation for their patented inventions, then their 
licensees or proven infringers must sell products or services embodying their 
patents. In the absence of such market adoption, there is rarely, if ever, a reward 
  
 29 John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 
2112 n.7 (2007). 
 30 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25. 
 31 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 108). 
 32 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 10). 
 33 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 105). 
 34 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 14) (arguing that an overbroad 
definition and biased sampling group were extrapolated to all NPEs causing Bessen & 
Meurer’s reported cost of $29 billion in 2011 to be inflated beyond a realistic estimate of 
the effect of NPE litigation). 
 35 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 105). 
 36 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 8–9). 
 37 Gene Quinn, Is Patent Litigation Really a Problem for Big Tech?, IPWATCHDOG 
(May 2, 2013, 8:30 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/01/is-patent-litigation-
really-a-problem-for-big-tech/id=39325/. 
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to be had.38 Such innovators do not typically have the access to the capital 
necessary to bring their inventions to market. They also do not have the existing 
channels of manufacturing, marketing and distribution. As a result, their options 
in trying to receive any compensation for their patented technologies are quite 
limited.39 
Bessen and Meurer also include practicing entities (patent owners who 
manufacture products) within their definition of non-practicing entities, if the 
acquired patents are “well outside the area in which they make products.”40 
Delineating between patents that a practicing company practices and those they 
hold for other reasons presents a very broad definition. 
2. Schwartz & Kesan: Question How to Define an NPE and Whether Litigation 
Costs Are a Deadweight Loss to Society 
Most definitions ignore the valuable roles that NPE’s may play in the 
marketplace. They create options to generate rewards for innovators who prefer 
to monetize rather than commercialize their patents themselves.41 Together with 
contingency fee lawyers whose business models depend on choosing the right 
patents and the right patentees, NPEs can create important avenues for 
appropriating rewards for valuable patent rights that are owned by non-market 
players.42 Entities that use their patented technologies to make products—
traditional practicing entities—may lack the resources to enforce their patent 
rights by hiring traditional patent attorneys who engage in hourly billing 
practices. The risk and uncertainty associated with representing patentees that do 
not have the ability to pay traditional hourly billing rates is prohibitive, and 
hence, many smaller patentees are shut out of the typical enforcement 
mechanisms that are available to large companies.43 Taking on the burden of 
enforcing patents through a contingency fee representation is an option that is 
available primarily for a select group of innovators with patent rights that are 
perceived as valuable before litigation commences.44 
A patent pool is another type of NPE that operates in a related fashion. 
RPX, which calls itself a defensive patent aggregator, has a unique business 
model; it provides subscriptions to customers who are repeat defendants in 
  
 38 John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 545 (2010) 
(“For small firms or independent inventors, . . . patent rights might be the only effective 
means to obtain a return on investments in research and development.”). 
 39 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 109). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. (manuscript at 110). 
 42 Id. 
 43 David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent 
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 347 (2012). 
 44 Id. 
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patent infringement lawsuits.45 RPX asserts that its subscription fees to its 
service are lower than the typical patent acquisition and defense costs a client 
would otherwise pay.46 In the patent litigation arms race, we have NPEs 
aggregating on both sides. 
Individuals have long assigned their patents to companies that have 
aggregated them. Usually, such patents came from employees who assigned 
inventions to their employers. As the numbers of employees and inventions 
grow, so does the company’s patent portfolio. It is not surprising that large 
companies have long aggregated many more patents than small companies.47 
A well-known example is IBM, which has more patents than any other 
practicing company.48 IBM’s patenting activity protects the company by saving 
litigation costs and raising revenue. IBM is rarely sued for patent infringement 
by its competitors because other practicing companies that might sue IBM 
would likely face multiple counterclaims of infringement.49 IBM’s portfolio 
reduces the threat of litigation by facilitating cross-licenses between IBM and 
the other party. Aggregators also use their portfolio as a source of revenue by 
licensing their technology. A prime example is a 1993 license of all of IBM’s 
personal computer patents to Dell, for $293 million.50 
Recently, large companies have begun to acquire large portfolios51 of 
patents from non-traditional sources such as individuals, acquired companies, 
and other large companies, rather than from their own employees.52 They have 
done so for three reasons. First, each patent purchased by these companies 
cannot be purchased by an NPE. Aggregation tends toward an arms race to 
avoid patent assertion by others. The value of defensive aggregation is in the 
lack of enforcement. Second, companies that lack an arsenal of defensive 
patents might buy patents from others or otherwise begin to aggregate patents to 
  
 45 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 104). 
 46 Id. 
 47 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2128 (2000). 
 48 Risch, supra note 22, at 10. 
 49 Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 321–22 (2010). 
 50 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 51 Amir Efrati & Spencer E. Ante, Google’s $12.5 Billion Gamble, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240531119033929045765099538214 
37960.html (Google purchased Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion, which included a 
portfolio of more than 17,000 patents.). 
 52 Risch, supra note 22, at 10. 
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protect themselves from lawsuits by competitors.53 Third, a large patent portfolio 
allows a greater freedom to innovate. Some claim that a large portfolio improves 
a company’s ability to further innovation in the form of patents and other 
development.54 This also means that the company can enhance its licensing 
efforts by including acquired patents in a portfolio along with patents developed 
in-house.55 
While scholars might lament a patent system that encourages more and 
more aggregation, there is no question that the practice has expanded, or that it 
was ever limited to NPEs.56 With this observation in mind, patent reformers seek 
to lessen the burden of frivolous litigation by awarding attorneys’ fees. 
D. Existing Fee-Shifting Mechanisms 
Fee-shifting is a remedy that allows a prevailing party to be recompensed 
for attorneys’ fees incurred during litigation, allowing the party to be more fully 
returned to its position prior to involvement in litigation. For defendants, a 
victory in court is still a losing situation because, even when they are successful 
on non-infringement and/or invalidity claims, they incur significant legal fees 
along the way. When attorneys’ fees are shifted onto the losing party, the 
prevailing party will receive its entire award, rather than the monetary judgment 
less attorneys’ fees. Current mechanisms for a party to receive attorneys’ fees 
include Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
1. Baseline Rule on Fee-Shifting 
In the current American patent litigation scheme, each litigant pays its 
own attorneys’ fees.57 This incentivizes abusive litigation by plaintiffs because it 
forces defendants to either settle quickly or defend the claims at significant 
cost.58 For instance, in nuisance suits, a patent owner files a patent infringement 
claim seeking to license a patent for royalty payments small enough that 
licensees decide it is not worth going to court. 
  
 53 Id. at 57. But see Edmund W. Kitsch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the 
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1739 (2000) (An 
inventor “will usually hold not one, but multiple rights, which will often be interrelated 
. . . . A single patent claim, much less than a single patent, often covers only a small part 
of the technology needed to market a commercially competitive device.”). 
 54 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
33–34 (2005). 
 55 Id. at 52 (finding the whole of a patent portfolio is greater than the sum of its parts). 
 56 Risch, supra note 22, at 11. 
 57 Gryphon, supra note 6, at 568. 
 58 Id. 
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Modern European codes prescribe “two-way fee-shifting,” colloquially 
referred to as the “English Rule.”59 Under the English Rule, the costs of 
litigation for each party are imposed on the defeated party, whether the defeated 
party is the plaintiff or the defendant60 This disincentivizes purely nuisance suits 
by increasing the potential costs to the plaintiff. In other words, plaintiffs would 
never file purely nuisance suits because a plaintiff who is only seeking a 
settlement would be unwilling to risk failure in litigation.61 When the plaintiff is 
unlikely to prevail, the plaintiff’s willingness to file a claim is much lower under 
the English Rule. 
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court held in 1796 that a 
prevailing party could not recover attorneys’ fees as damages, a doctrine now 
known as the “American Rule.”62 Under the default “American Rule,” a 
prevailing party generally cannot recover attorneys’ fees as damages unless 
permitted by legislation.63 Congress has bypassed this default rule in the past by 
making explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees in order to 
effectuate important legislative policies. Examples of such legislation awarding 
attorneys’ fees are present in antitrust statutes under the Clayton Act64 and in the 
Civil Rights Act.65 
Under the American Rule, even if a plaintiff is unwilling to go to trial, it 
is still profitable for the plaintiff to file a nuisance claim whenever the plaintiff’s 
cost of filing is less than the defendant’s cost of defense, because the defendant 
will be willing to pay the plaintiff a settlement of any amount up to the 
defendant’s would-be defense costs.66 Relatedly, under the American Rule 
(whenever the cost of filing is less than the defense costs plus the plaintiff’s 
  
 59 Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 46 (1984), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/ 
vol47/iss1/3/. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796). 
 63 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1974) 
(“[C]ircumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of 
discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to determine.”). 
 64 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and 
shall recover threefold the damages by his sustained, and the cost of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.”). 
 65 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2006) (“In any action commenced pursuant to this 
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall 
be liable for costs the same as a private person.”). 
 66 David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their 
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L & ECON. 3, 3 (1985), available at 
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/5_Inter_Rev_Law_Econ_3.pdf. 
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expected judgment) a plaintiff with a low likelihood of prevailing, will file a 
claim more often.67 
2. Federal Floor for Attorneys’ Fees: Rule 11 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the federal 
floor for recovery of attorneys’ fees in “frivolous” actions.68 To evaluate 
frivolousness, courts use an objective standard of reasonableness, and do not 
require bad faith or an otherwise culpable state of mind.69 
All pleadings, motions, papers, and representations to the court must meet 
the requirements of Rule 11 or they risk triggering sanctions against the 
offending parties and their attorneys. A patentee planning to take action against 
a suspected infringer should be especially attentive to Rule 11(b), which states 
that a person, by presenting to the court “a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” (1) the 
purpose of the paper or pleading is not improper; (2) the legal assertions are not 
frivolous; and (3) the factual contentions have or are likely to have evidentiary 
support.70 Under Rule 11(c), a court may impose sanctions against parties or 
attorneys that have violated Rule 11(b).71 
Generally, the Federal Circuit has analyzed the pre-filing requirements of 
Rule 11(b) in patent infringement cases under the constraint of non-
frivolousness72 and as two separate requirements: legal and factual.73 If the court 
determines that a party or attorney has violated Rule 11(b), “the court may 
award to the party prevailing on the [motion for sanctions] reasonable expenses 
and attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.”74 Currently, 
trial courts have discretion to grant expenses or fees to the prevailing party, but 
the jurisprudence of Rule 11 motions in patent cases shows that the required pre-
filing inquiry is a low hurdle for plaintiffs, as some infringement analysis is 
required, but not necessarily a claim chart.75 
  
 67 Id. at 5, 9. 
 68 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (Sanctions imposed under the rule “must be limited to what 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated . . . [and may take the form of] an order directing payment to the movant of part 
or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .”). 
 69 Douglas J. Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your Adversary, 36 
No. 2 LITIGATION 21, 25 (2010). 
 70 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (emphasis added). 
 71 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 72 Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 73 Antonius v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 74 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 75 Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1301. 
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Additionally, Rule 11 contains a safe harbor provision that requires that 
any motion for sanctions must be served at least twenty-one days before the 
motion is filed with the court so that the offending party has the opportunity to 
withdraw the challenged filing. Thus, if caught in violation of Rule 11, bringing 
a facially invalid or inaccurate patent complaint, the plaintiff will have the 
opportunity to abandon the suit or file an amended complaint before the motion 
for sanctions can actually be filed.76 It is clear that Rule 11 sanctions do not 
adequately protect defendants from nuisance claims. 
3. Exceptional Cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285 
Fee-shifting is not a new concept in intellectual property law. Congress 
has allowed prevailing parties in copyright cases to receive attorney’s fees as 
well.77 However, initially, the Patent Act of 1790 did not include any provisions 
for the award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.78 
In order to obtain an award of attorney fees under § 285, the prevailing 
party must show by clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional.79 
The attorney-fee-shifting provision of the Patent Act provides that, a “court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing 
party.”80 This remedy is intended to reimburse the alleged infringer for 
defending an action improperly brought. Absent Rule 11 misconduct or fraud 
during patent prosecution, the defendant must show that the case is 
“exceptional” by showing that the litigation was both (a) brought in subjective 
bad faith; and (b) objectively baseless.81 An exceptional case finding is 
determined on a claim-by-claim basis and both prongs must be satisfied for each 
asserted claim. The Federal Circuit has also held that attorneys’ fees should be 
awarded in cases involving “vexatious or unjustified litigation” or “frivolous 
filings.”82 These types of cases present inconsistent standards that fail to provide 
  
 76 Thomas I. Ross, Making Patent Plaintiffs Pay, 18 NO. 6 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 
1, 2 (2006). 
 77 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its 
discretion may allow recovery of full costs . . . the court may also award a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.”). 
 78 Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting 
Attorneys’ Fees, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 351, 362 (2013). 
 79 MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907, 915 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing 
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing 
Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 82 Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
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clear guidelines to district courts, which must apply the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 285.83 
Despite defendants’ growing desire to use fee-shifting to recoup costs and 
deter future abusive litigation, it is difficult for litigants to meet the “exceptional 
case” standard for fee-shifting under the Patent Statute. Further, Congress failed 
to codify fee-shifting in the most recent patent reform act, the America Invents 
Act of 2011.84 Ultimately, Congress altered rules limiting joinder of 
defendants,85 but a fee-shifting provision was omitted for reasons that remain 
unclear.86 
E. Fee-Shifting Proposal to Curb Trolling Abuse: The SHIELD Act 
On February 27, 2013, Representatives Jason Chaffetz and Peter DeFazio 
introduced the most recent version of the SHIELD Act.87 The proposed 
legislation includes a hybrid fee-shifting provision and a carefully drafted 
bonding requirement88 that could provide a strong structure for a compromise 
between the English and American Rules. Under the SHIELD Act of 2013, any 
adverse party must post a bond (determined by the court) to cover full costs of 
the litigation, including attorneys’ fees, unless the court determines the adverse 
party (1) is an original inventor; (2) has substantially invested in production or 
sale of an item covered by the patent; or (3) is a university or a technology 
transfer organization which commercializes technologies developed by a 
university.89 This bonding requirement forces plaintiffs to carefully consider the 
likelihood that their claim will succeed rather than filing a nuisance suit, 
regardless of merit, to put pressure on a potential licensee. 
  
 83 Chen, supra note 78, at 15. 
 84 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. § 1454). 
 85 35 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-49) (requiring claims against 
defendants arise out of “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions . . . of 
the same accused product or process”); see Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-
trolls.html (finding misjoinder rules have had their intended effect). 
 86 Chen, supra note 78, at 366. 
 87 See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, 
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (would amend § 285(A). Recovery of litigation 
costs). 
 88 Id. (stating that new sections would be added including § 285A(b) “BOND 
REQUIRED.—Any party that fails to meet a condition under subsection (a)(3) shall be 
required to post a bond in an amount determined by the court to cover the recovery of full 
costs described in subsection (a)(4).”). 
 89 Id. 
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1. Defining Bad Actors 
The SHIELD Act of 2013 approaches the challenge of defining bad actors 
in a novel manner. Instead of attempting to define the bad actors it seeks to 
target (patent trolls and other non-practicing entities), the Act of 2013 uses a 
negative definition;90 it applies to everyone that does not fall into one of the 
three carve-outs. The Act describes three categories of patent infringement 
plaintiffs which typically are not “patent trolls” or “non- practicing entities,” and 
are, therefore, exempt from the attorneys’ fee-shifting provision.91 Under the 
SHIELD Act of 2013, a party is exempt from fee shifting when it can show it (1) 
is the original inventor; (2) has substantially invested in production or sale of an 
item covered by the patent; or (3) is a university or is a technology transfer 
organization which commercializes technologies developed by a university. The 
categories carved out for “original inventors” and “university or technology 
transfer organizations” are clearly defined and should be easily evaluated by the 
courts. However, the litigants will likely argue over whether a losing party falls 
into the “exploitation of the patent” category.92 The exploitation exception 
pertains to cases where the losing party “can provide documentation . . . of 
substantial investment . . . in the exploitation of the patent through production or 
sale of an item covered by the patent.”93 This new carve-out for entities which 
engage in “substantial investment” will be the focus of much interpretation, but 
overall, this SHIELD Act of 2013’s definition of bad actors is clearly novel. It 
remains to be seen whether it will be an effective approach to mitigate bad 
actors in the patent system. 
2. Automatic Fee-Shifting 
The 2013 version of the SHIELD Act, unlike the 2012 version,94 does not 
require a judicial determination that the complainant did not have a “reasonable 
likelihood of succeeding” in its claim for patent infringement. Instead, the 2013 
  
 90 Chen, supra note 78, at 376. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. § 285A(d)(2) (1st Sess. 2013). 
 93 Chen, supra note 78, at 378. 
 94 See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, 
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the 
validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent, 
upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the 
patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award 
the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees, other than the United States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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version of the SHIELD Act simply forces the losing plaintiff to pay by default, 
unless the losing plaintiff meets one of the three criteria discussed above or there 
are exceptional circumstances making the award unjust.95 
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Low-merit legal suits, which clutter the legal system and ultimately raise 
costs for consumers, can be reduced by patent litigation reform.96 Fee shifting is 
one way to effect this change. Plaintiffs will be less likely to file low-merit 
claims when forced to bear the risk of their opponent’s legal expenses in 
addition to their own. 
There has been a growing trend over the last decade for third parties to 
acquire patent rights as an investment vehicle and assert those rights to obtain a 
return on their investment. Unfortunately, in many cases, the assertion is utterly 
baseless, yet respectable companies with a need to make reasonable business 
decisions are compelled to pay to settle these cases because it is far less 
expensive to pay than it is to fight and win. This is certainly a problem: bad 
actors bringing frivolous patent suits against good companies with the goal of 
extracting a settlement from those good companies based on the inevitable 
rational business judgment that it is far less expensive to settle the frivolous suit 
rather than pay much larger legal fees to prove non-infringement and/or 
invalidity. No one can reasonably defend this type of abusive conduct and any 
legislation that could effectively eradicate this bad behavior, without prejudicing 
innocent patent owners, would be a tremendous benefit. 
A. Solution: Revision of § 285 
An appropriate mechanism to award attorneys’ fees in cases that are 
frivolous exists in § 285 of the Patent Act. Currently, this provision reads: 
§ 285. Attorney’s Fees 
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.97 
This provision should require objective rather than subjective unreasonableness. 
Therefore, I propose that 35 U.S.C. § 285 should be amended and a new section 
should be inserted to read: 
§ 285. Attorney Fees 
The court in exceptional cases shall award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. 
 
  
 95 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 96 Gryphon, supra note 6, at 568. 
 97 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006). 
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A. EXCEPTIONAL CASE DEFINED. – For purposes of this section, 
an ‘exceptional case’ is one in which an adverse party pleads a count of 
patent infringement that is objectively unreasonable. 
This change eliminates the cumbersome two-prong test courts use to determine 
whether to shift attorneys’ fees and institutes a single objective standard that can 
be applied consistently across the board. Additionally, it targets frivolous 
litigation while avoiding the downfalls of the proposed SHIELD Act of 2013 
discussed above. 
1. Not Conditional with Respect to Identity of Patent Owner 
Unlike the SHIELD Act, my solution focuses on the substance of the 
infringement claim rather than the identity of the patent owner.98 Legislative 
definitions of “bad actors” used in various other solutions come from an 
outdated philosophy that seeks to cast aside infringement litigation brought by 
patent owners who do not practice their inventions. Rather, all entities that assert 
claims of patent infringement should be held to the same standard of conduct.99 
Attempts to single out a class of patent owners will devalue patents, reduce the 
ability of patent owners to realize a return on their investment, and ultimately 
decrease the incentives to innovate.100 
2. Objective Reasonableness Inquiry 
The amendment of § 285 dispenses with the SHIELD Act’s proposed 
“loser pays” rule, and uses an objective reasonableness standard. The essence of 
the frivolous litigation problem that must be addressed is the lack of merit to the 
infringement claim. The earliest point to determine whether a suit is 
unreasonable is at the pleading stage, but a party with a small chance of success 
is more reasonable in continuing at an earlier stage, while at a later stage would 
not reasonably continue. As litigation moves forward to the summary judgment 
stage, the Markman claim construction hearing, at the latest, marks the 
opportunity to clearly assess the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in light of the 
  
 98 Most non-practicing entity definitions are unworkable because they are both 
overbroad and under-inclusive. See infra Part I. 
 99 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 2 (manuscript at 119) (finding that focusing on 
the parties rather than the merits of the patent claims will lead to a fundamentally flawed 
and unfair result that will “significantly distort the supply of inventions”). 
 100 Paul D. Ackerman, The SHIELD Act – Is Creating “Second-Class Citizenship” for 
Certain Patent Owners the Answer to the “Troll Problem”?, THE POINT OF NOVELTY 
(Mar. 1, 2013), http://pointofnovelty.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-shield-act-is-creating-
second-class.html (finding that legislation should target conduct rather than 
discriminating against an entire class of patent owners, and that the SHIELD act may not 
be tailored to solving the problem of nuisance litigation “without significantly impairing 
the value of all patents”). 
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court’s reading of the patent claims.101 It is this stage of patent litigation where 
the court has performed claim construction and the patent owner will either have 
a reasonable infringement claim or not as a matter of law. 
An overhaul of the statute, such as proposed by the SHIELD Act is not 
necessary, because § 285 is clear and simple. By re-defining an exceptional 
case, my solution will keep the original terminology, but would dispense with 
the subjective requirement for finding frivolousness. 
B. Advantage of Revision over Existing Mechanisms and the SHIELD Act 
The SHIELD Act directly burdens NPEs and is a significant step toward 
the goal of reducing egregious legal disputes. The bigger picture is whether the 
lawsuits are being brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid 
patent,102 or whether the defendants are merely easy targets for a nuisance 
lawsuit. That requires looking beyond the identity of the patentee.103 It means we 
need to evaluate the infringement claims being asserted to determine whether 
litigation is legitimate or nuisance, which turns on whether there are credible 
patent claims that are valid, enforceable, and infringed. 
Opponents of fee-shifting legislation must always raise the argument that 
small inventors who do not abuse the court system may be wrongfully 
discouraged from filing patent infringement claims as a result of this fee-shifting 
measure because the increased risk of bearing the defendants’ litigation costs 
would be too much to bear. Any fee-shifting provision should be limited to 
language that will not have the effect of deterring valid claims of infringement. 
The SHIELD Act of 2013 accomplishes this by awarding attorneys’ fees 
whenever a defendant prevails on invalidity or noninfringement against an NPE 
plaintiff.104 
  
 101 Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). 
 102 In this regard, the SHIELD Act of 2013 takes a step back from the 2012 version as 
it proposes a strict fee-shifting provision without regard to reasonableness of the 
infringement claim. 
 103 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 22–23) (“The heterogeneous nature 
of NPEs – ranging from universities, to semiconductor design firms, to trolls – suggests 
that policy reform should address troll-like behavior rather than merely status as an 
NPE.”). 
 104 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. § 285A(a)(4) (1st Sess. 2013). 
[N]otwithstanding section 285, the Court shall award the recovery of full costs 
to any prevailing party asserting invalidity or noninfringement, including 
reasonable attorney’s fees, other than the United States, upon the entry of a 
final judgment if the court determines that the adverse party did not meet at 
least one of the conditions described in subsection (d), unless the court finds 
that exceptional circumstances make an award unjust. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
274 Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property [Vol. 13 
 
 
 
1. Conditions Defining Good and Bad Actors 
Of the three protected categories of plaintiffs that the Shield Act exempts 
from mandatory cost shifting, “(2) Exploitation of the patent,”105 will be a fact-
specific determination for courts to make. This definition intends to carve out an 
exception for the traditional “practicing companies” but could provide a loop-
hole for NPEs.106 The term “substantial investment” will require courts to 
scrutinize patents obtained through research and development and those 
acquired to be asserted (by both practicing entities and various types of NPEs). 
“The item covered by the patent” will surely be an issue of claim construction.107 
As this is a matter of law, surely a Markman hearing must occur before a 
decision on the SHIELD Act motion is made.108 
The “original inventor” category is clearly defined and should be easily 
evaluated by courts. This category also includes original assignees of patents, 
which is likewise easily verifiable. 
  
 105 Id. §§ 285A(d)(1)–(3). 
(1) Original inventor. Such party is the inventor, a joint inventor, or in the case 
of a patent filed by and awarded to an assignee of the original inventor or joint 
inventor, the original assignee of the patent. 
(2) Exploitation of the patent. Such party can provide documentation to the 
court of substantial investment made by such party in the exploitation of the 
patent through production or sale of an item covered by the patent. 
(3) University or technology transfer organization. Such party is- 
(A) an institution of higher education (as that term is defined in section 
101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001)); or  
(B) a technology transfer organization whose primary purpose is to 
facilitate the commercialization of technology developed by one or more 
institutions of higher education. 
Id. 
 106 NPEs will argue that a substantial investment is made when they acquire a patent. 
Will the substantial investment require simply that consideration be paid for the rights of 
a patent? Surely not. However, to target NPEs the courts will have to craft a totality of 
the circumstances rule that examines the specific technology covered by the patent and 
the marketplace in which the company operates. 
 107 Congress’ usage of “item covered by the patent” is a misnomer because claims 
delineate the rights of the patent holder. Presumably the legislature did not intend to 
exclude method claims, which do not literally “cover an item.” 
 108 Under the “exploitation of the patent” exception, it seems that companies who buy 
patents and assert them will have to argue that they practice the patent they are asserting. 
If Google attempts to assert patents it acquired from Motorola, it is an NPE under the 
SHIELD Act with respect to those patents which it does not engage in “production or sale 
of an item covered.” This assumes that Google will not satisfy the “substantial 
investment” inquiry. Google’s investment is no different than an NPE when it buys a 
patent and later asserts it. The distinguishing characteristic, presumably, is litigation 
conduct and the merits of the infringement claim. 
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The “University or technology transfer organization” category presents a 
straightforward definition of a University taken from the Higher Education Act 
of 1965. However, defining a technology transfer organization as one “whose 
primary purpose is to facilitate the commercialization of technology developed 
by one or more institutions of higher education” may provide an avenue for 
NPEs to find a safe haven.109 Could NPE shell companies do business as tech 
transfer organizations for Universities? Will Universities become vessels for 
NPE patent monetization? These scenarios seem unlikely because the definitions 
of Universities and tech transfer offices will likely be construed narrowly by a 
court. 
The SHIELD Act is presented as legislation that will favor large and 
small businesses, as both are targets of NPE plaintiffs. NPE litigation is usually 
undesirable for small business defendants110 because the NPE has substantial 
leverage over the company in several ways. First, responding to discovery can 
be very burdensome and disruptive for the company, but not for the NPE, which 
generally has few documents to produce and perhaps no witnesses.111 Further, 
the stakes for the company can be substantial, while the NPE has nothing to lose 
but its patent.112 Moreover, the practicing company faces potentially large legal 
bills for defending the patent lawsuit and challenging the validity of even 
overbroad patents, while the NPE likely has small or no legal bills, because it 
likely has a contingency fee agreement with its lawyers. 
But, what about small business/patent-owner plaintiffs? The patent 
system is one of the few tools that small businesses have to compete against 
larger, more established players in the market. Patent owners with valid and 
infringed patents must be considered within this category as well as they often 
turn to NPE’s to monetize their assets. The SHIELD Act would clearly devalue 
patents, because the subsequent patent owners’ ability to bring suit will be 
encumbered by fee-shifting and bonding provisions. 
Does this mean a small company’s patent is less marketable? It seems that 
the SHIELD Act would create a second-class status for patents, thereby 
prohibiting inventors from realizing the full value of their patents should they 
choose to sell them.113 
2. Automatic Loser Pays 
A fee-shifting scheme that simply forces the loser to pay by default 
bypasses the need for establishing a “reasonableness” standard either upfront in 
  
 109 Michael Risch, Scratching my Head Over the SHIELD Act, MADISONIAN (May 10, 
2013), http://madisonian.net/2013/03/10/scratching-my-head/. 
 110 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 25 (manuscript at 24). 
 111 Id. (manuscript at 29). 
 112 Id. at 14 (finding the mean legal costs for defense range from $420,000 for small 
and medium companies to $1.52 million for large companies). 
 113 Ackerman, supra note 100. 
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legislation or later through judicial precedent. To this end, the 2013 version of 
the SHIELD Act, unlike the 2012 version,114 does not require a judicial 
determination that the complainant did not have a “reasonable likelihood of 
succeeding” in its claim for patent infringement. Instead, the 2013 version of the 
SHIELD Act simply forces the losing plaintiff to pay by default, unless the 
losing party falls into one of the groups listed in §§ 285A(d)(1)–(3).115 
An alternative standard would not award fees simply because the patent 
owner does not prevail, but would require more by setting a traditional standard 
such as “reasonable likelihood of succe[ss]” versus “loser pays by default.” In 
order to be successful, legislation implementing fee-shifting must include a clear 
definition of the standard that must be met to trigger the award of attorneys’ 
fees. One of the greatest weaknesses of the SHIELD Act of 2012 was lack of 
clarity in its use of the term “reasonable likelihood of succeeding” in 
establishing the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees.116 A more rigorous 
definition or explanation of the term “reasonable likelihood of succeeding” 
would have been helpful in giving courts less opportunity to circuitously debate 
the Act, giving all parties—plaintiffs, defendants, third parties, and courts—a 
better understanding of the impact of the legislation, and would, therefore, lead 
to more efficient and seamless implementation of the fee-shifting provision.117 
If a reasonableness standard is desirable, two criteria for establishing such 
a standard are important. First, the new legislation should clearly delineate the 
distinction between objective versus subjective reasonableness standards and 
should precisely clarify which type of reasonableness standard should be applied 
to the new fee-shifting scheme.118 Because remedies already exist to address 
subjective unreasonableness under Rule 11, the next generation of this 
  
 114 See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, 
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 285A(a) (2d Sess. 2012). 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 285, in an action disputing the 
validity or alleging the infringement of a computer hardware or software patent, 
upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the 
patent did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding, the court may award 
the recovery of full costs to the prevailing party, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees, other than the United States. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 115 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 
845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 116 See Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2012, 
H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. § 285A(a) (2d Sess. 2012); Chen, supra note 78, at 378. 
 117 Perhaps this will follow the USPTO standard for accepting petitions for inter partes 
review: if a third party petitioner demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on at 
least one claim challenged in the petition. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2006); Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299–312 (2011). 
 118 Chen, supra note 78, at 378. 
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legislation should elect to use an objective reasonableness test to evaluate the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of success. 
Second, the legislation should define when the likelihood of success 
should be evaluated. Several points in the litigation timeline might serve as 
convenient points for evaluation: just prior to filing the infringement claim, at 
the summary judgment stage, or after the Markman claim construction hearing. 
At each of these distinct points, a reasonable plaintiff who is evaluating the 
likelihood of success of this litigation may be expected to either abandon or 
continue the litigation depending on the plaintiff’s perception of the likelihood 
of success. While a plaintiff with a lower likelihood of success at an earlier stage 
in litigation may reasonably continue to pursue litigation, a plaintiff with a lower 
likelihood of success at a later stage in litigation may be seen as less reasonable 
in continuing litigation. An earlier understanding or evaluation of the likelihood 
of successful litigation reduces the incidence of pure nuisance claims.119 
III. CRITICISMS OF THE SOLUTION 
Potential criticisms of this solution will address administrative efficacy of 
the statute, economic efficiency, and public policy. 
Some will question the effectiveness of a solution that does not single out 
NPE’s directly and complain that it operates more broadly than necessary. Yes, 
this statute does operate more broadly than a carve-out such as the SHIELD Act, 
but it does so because the litigation conduct is the problem, not the identity of 
the plaintiff. This solution holds all patent holders to the same standard, thereby 
preventing bad actors from finding potential loopholes in the defined safe-haven 
groups of the SHIELD Act. 
A second potential criticism is that the solution may not be effective 
against patent trolls with broad patents. This legislation gives defendants the 
financial incentive to stand up to a plaintiff when they otherwise would not have 
the resources to do so. This solution is targeted at defending frivolous claims of 
litigation and striking down invalid patents. A case in which the claims actually 
read on a defendant’s device will not be remedied by § 285. Issues of 
interpretation of functional claims and objections to broad patents with a wider 
claim scope than may still be concerns, but are outside the scope of this Article. 
This is not a quick fix to the problem of NPE’s asserting patents. It is true 
that costs will be incurred prior to and after the Markman hearing, but the 
opportunity of a fee-shifting remedy is a significant deterrent to frivolous patent 
  
 119 See id. at 379. 
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suits and presents ammunition for defendants to use when negotiating a license 
or deciding trial strategy.120 
CONCLUSION 
Society is best served when the patent system incentivizes innovation, but 
does not overcompensate by imposing unjustified costs onto consumers. Under 
the current law, poor quality patents and frivolous infringement claims impose 
such unjustified costs on society that ultimately lead to inefficiency. The award 
of attorneys’ fees is an important remedy, which can change the behavior of bad 
actors by allowing victims of frivolous litigation to defend themselves and 
possibly invalidate low quality patents. Altering the requirements for awarding 
attorney’s fees (by changing the definition of “exceptional case” under 35 
U.S.C. § 285 to one in which an adverse party pleads a count of patent 
infringement that is objectively unreasonable) will hold patent infringement 
plaintiffs to a higher standard of conduct. This solution dis-incentivizes nuisance 
claims by increasing the financial risk on the part of the plaintiff and decreases 
the cost of litigation to innocent defendants. 
  
 120 Ross, supra note 76, at 4 (outlining a trial strategy of building a record of 
communication that forces a plaintiff to take fee-shifting seriously and that can provide 
negotiating leverage or serve as foundation for a successful motion under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285). 
